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SUMMARY
Apart from the normal, general tasks of
bankruptcy, there are a number of special
functions and tasks to be considered under
the circumstances of transition. The
introduction of bankruptcy must fit into a
general sequence of institution building and
economic policy. These aspects must be
considered in the timing and design of a
bankruptcy institution. When experts list
the jolts undergone by the Hungarian
economy in the early years of the transition,
they frequently include the oft-mentioned
demand shocks (collapse of markets, lifting
of state protection, liberalization of markets,
etc.) and some important institutional,
‘supply-side’ shocks. Some of these
institutional shocks were as painful as the
demand shocks, notably Hungary’s harsh
bankruptcy law, which called for major
managerial effort from debtors and
creditors, while closely affecting much
corporate activity. For instance, the
creditworthiness of firms changed almost
overnight.
In terms of general economic policy,
the message given by the circumstances of
the introduction of bankruptcy may deter-
mine the way that economic agents inter-
pret new institutions and government in-
tentions and the credit they give to eco-
nomic policy. For bankruptcy is among the
basic institutions for enforcing property
rights and contract law, and the main
means by which the negative consequences
of risk taking and failure can apply. The
absence of credible bankruptcy practice will
encourage opportunistic behaviour by
agents, in commercial relations and in their
approach to other institutional reforms, in-
cluding privatization. Realization of the
limits of state intervention and the simulta-
neous opportunity for managers to become
owners (or at least to influence the privati-
zation of the firms they manage) encour-
aged them to curb their opportunistic prac-
tices and concentrate on strategic adjust-
ment. The limits on adjustment were in
most cases due anyway to inadequate finan-
cial resources rather than opportunistic be-
haviour or incompetence. Hungarian priva-
tization gained momentum at exactly the
same time as the new bankruptcy law was
introduced.
However, it is important to emphasize
that asset transfers were promoted by the
bankruptcy law through several channels.
There was a clear direct impact from the
physical exit of firms from markets, result-
ing in liquidation and asset sales, but ad-
justing firms were also forced through
bankruptcy and privatization, so that assets
could be reallocated wherever possible to
uses that offered a better return. This pro-
duced a massive flow of assets, despite the
fact that local capital markets were still ru-
dimentary. Asset transfers were typical for
all the adjusting firms – for those who did
this successfully and escaped formal market
exit, and for those who did not.
The introduction of the new bank-
ruptcy law caused massive macroeconomic
changes. Although the law itself was not
responsible for the shocks or the reasons
behind corporate failures, it triggered them
simultaneously in many companies. The
negative microeconomic developments, co-
inciding in time, compounded to cause seri-
ous macroeconomic problems. One-third of
the economy was threatened by liquidation
and in a financial state to justify such a pro-
cedure. Fears of severe consequences were
understandable, but the bankruptcy institu-
tion proved to be efficient in reducing losses
to a considerably lower level.
Three factors can be mentioned. First,
the regulations showed preference for reor-
ganization for nearly two years, then an
amendment practically closed the paths to
de jure restructuring. This meant that the
law, in the initial, most serious period, pro-
vided opportunities for sides to reach a set-
tlement. Secondly, when formal reorgani-
zation was contained, the law still allowed
liquidations to transform into reorganiza-
tions in cases where the debtor was retained
as a going concern and its activity was re-
garded as viable. The restructuring of debt-
ors was promoted mainly by the way liqui-
dators were remunerated. This side of the
law seriously weakened the position of
creditors in liquidation proceedings, since
they were no longer awarded increased
control over the activity of the liquidator.
But the outcome of the changes was that
liquidators took over the role of formal re-
organization. The latter disappeared, but
wherever some production or meaningful
activity by the debtor remained, the liqui-
dators would exert themselves to maintain
and consolidate that activity.
The third factor that ameliorated the
consequences of bankruptcy was action by
the state. Ministries and still more the State
Privatization Agency played an active role
in avoiding crises and made efforts to bail
out certain firms. Most importantly, it me-
diated among the parties – who in some
cases were almost exclusively representa-
tives of the state. It is argued in this paper
that state intervention in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings is undesirable, especially in the
early phase when proceedings are triggered.
Hungarian practice generally allowed the
proceedings to start, but there was inter-
vention in several cases when important
firms could not be rescued through either of
the other ‘built-in’ factors. The number of
firms that benefited from direct state inter-
vention was confined to one or two dozen,
so that these few exceptions did not under-
mine the new-found credibility of economic
policy.
Reorganization agreements were also
promoted outside judicial proceedings.
Banks were urged to settle their disputes
with debtors and manage their non-
performing portfolios. The law on financial
institutions required banks to establish
portfolio-management departments and
prescribed strict prudential regulations. In
addition, the state put up very considerable
sums of money, to help banks to build up
the necessary risk reserves and to compen-
sate them to some extent for writing off
certain parts of their debt portfolios. Bank
recapitalization was in fact the strongest
direct action undertaken by the Hungarian
government to eliminate the liquidity prob-
lems in the economy. The bank consolida-
tions were not very damaging to credibility.
The customers (debtors) of banks were not
affected directly. Banks usually did not
write off the obligations of active firms,
which were rescheduled or converted into
equity instead. On the other hand, the
elimination of non-performing assets was
enhanced. As far as banks themselves were
concerned, cleaning up their portfolios was
a precondition for privatization to foreign
buyers. The prospect of privatization pro-
vided the safeguard against bank oppor-
tunism.
The outcome of bankruptcy proceed-
ings also has to be gauged in terms of asset
restructuring. Asset losses, that occurred in
the event, cannot be regarded as transfers,
but they are an important constituent of re-
structuring – the necessary Schumpeterian
process of creative destruction. They are not
necessarily connected directly with bank-
ruptcy, on which real asset transfers may
depend either directly or indirectly. The di-
rect link is most obvious in a sale of assets
under a reorganization agreement or liqui-
dation proceedings. Asset transfers, on the
other hand, occurred also in day-by-day
business, in some cases linked indirectly to
bankruptcy, as firms sold assets to avoid
bankruptcy – to gain cash and repay debt or
change corporate activity and avoid a pro-
spective long-term crisis. Without the threat
function of bankruptcy, this type of asset
restructuring might not have occurred or
been less vigorous. The mere existence of
the bankruptcy institution can therefore
trigger major restructuring activity, in-
cluding asset transfers.
5INTRODUCTION
The success of the transition depends
greatly on microeconomic changes and ba-
sic restructuring of corporate activities. The
long-term adjustment process necessitates a
general modernization, while technical
modernization calls for new products and
production facilities, or occasionally
changes in the character of activities: exit
from one market before entering another, in
which a firm may have competitive advan-
tages. This longer-term adjustment, called
‘strategic restructuring’ by Grosfeld and
Roland (1996), presupposes changes of ac-
tivities: downsizing of less competitive ones
and modernization and development of oth-
ers. Changes of this magnitude are often
carried out through asset restructuring and
transfer, including the sale of some assets
and the purchase of others.
The asset restructuring and long-term
adjustment of firms can be enhanced by
measures of economic policy. The starting
point is the changing environment. If mar-
ket changes are cushioned by policy meas-
ures, firms no longer feel the market forces
acting upon them, so that restructuring may
be delayed or prevented. On the other hand,
it is possible to amplify the positive, desir-
able reaction of firms to market forces.
Bankruptcy institutions may serve to en-
courage business associations to face the
challenges and make the positive adjust-
ment steps expected of them. In an ideal
case, the asset transfers and restructuring
that result from adjustment activities will
occur in time to prevent a company’s finan-
cial position being critically undermined. If
the latter should happen, the channels and
tools for adjustment may derive from
bankruptcy. The judicial frames of reor-
ganization may be replaced by out-of-court
settlements, if need be. In either case,
bankruptcy plays an important direct and
indirect role in the process of corporate
adjustment and asset restructuring.
The empirical part of the research
project described in this paper deals with
asset restructuring and the circumstances in
which old assets are used by new owners in
Hungary. The focus is on the theoretical
background to the questionnaire design,
with two purposes in mind. (i) The paper
sets out to summarize the main policy-
related consequences of the bankruptcy
regulations, in the ninth year since the in-
troduction of the new bankruptcy law. It
looks primarily at issues that directly affect
corporate activities, including decisions on
asset restructuring. (ii) The other task of the
paper is to describe the major avenues of
asset restructuring and estimate their rela-
tive weights. Both these purposes are rele-
vant to the empirical survey. The first pro-
vides information for the questionnaire de-
sign, highlights the most important rela-
tionships between the parties, and reveals
the major reasons for failure in the old use
of assets and potential success in the new.
The second helps in arriving at a careful
balance in the sample structure, between
different ways of asset restructuring.
SOME GENERAL AND SOME TRAN-
SITION-SPECIFIC FEATURES OF
BANKRUPTCY REGULATIONS
That actors in the economy should suffer
the consequences of failure is as essential a
component of a market economy as the risk
taking essential to a market economy.
Bankruptcy regulations have to strike a bal-
ance, ensuring that the consequences of
business failure work to guarantee basic
property rights (claims by creditors and
owners) without inhibiting risk taking. The
balance is also supported by a web of other
measures, such as existing property laws
and mechanisms of enforcement, secured
credits, foreclosure, creditor control over
debtors, watchdog institutions, and so on.
These regulations affect each other directly
or indirectly and the interplay between
them strongly influences the behaviour of
6creditors and debtors. For example, if the
bankruptcy regulations fail to protect
creditors’ property rights sufficiently,
creditors may prefer to foreclose on their
collateral rather than relying on bank-
ruptcy. The choice here depends also on the
maturity and current conditions of the
capital markets and on the overall economic
situation. These general conditions deter-
mine success in using the various tools for
securing property rights.
Bankruptcy and liquidation occur
when other, less radical paths out of failure
are closed. The physical exit of a firm from
the market is followed by the sale of its as-
sets. Bankruptcy is therefore directly linked
with asset restructuring. Asset restructuring
may also feature in less drastic solutions to
financial distress. Corporate failure may be
preceded or forestalled by downsizing and
avoidance of bankruptcy, through out-of-
court settlements between creditors and
debtors or formal reorganization. Asset re-
structuring is not necessarily bound to
firms’ market failure and bankruptcy, for in
a broader sense, it is part of the resource-
allocation system of a market economy. If
resource allocation were perfect and effi-
cient (based on sufficiently available infor-
mation by all market participants), there
would be no need for bankruptcy to exist.
Resources would always flow to where they
would gain the highest returns. Imperfect
financial markets and information asym-
metry between insiders (managers) and
outsiders (claimants) bring a need for
separate guarantees for creditors.
Bankruptcy has several important ba-
sic functions in supporting asset realloca-
tion. Selection is performed by the institu-
tion of bankruptcy when company manag-
ers fail to make efficient use of assets. This
forces unviable economic units or corporate
activities effectively to exit markets and al-
locate their assets to more efficient uses.
Bankruptcy also has personal consequences
for managers. The increasing control by
creditors or the sale of assets may cost them
their jobs. Thus manager failures threaten
their future incomes and devalue their po-
sition on the labour market. This threat is an
effective restraint on managers, dissuading
them from misusing their superior stock of
corporate information.
The problem of information asymme-
try emerges already under normal business
conditions (expressed by the well-known
principal-agent problem). The problem be-
comes more complicated in the case of cor-
porate failure, where managers’ insider
knowledge may also be used against credi-
tors, as they behave opportunistically and
try to avoid failure and potential liquidation
by pursuing risky undertakings. The rescue
operations they try may exhaust much of
the company’s asset stock or increase its
debts, with managers viewing the higher
risk of failure as immaterial. For creditors,
careful evaluation of risks and potential
benefits is vital if they are not to lose more
or throw good money after bad. Opportun-
istic behaviour by managers can be avoided
if strong negative consequences are in sight
and the control of bankruptcy by creditors
is sufficiently increased.
Apart from the normal, general tasks
of bankruptcy (selection, exit, threat, en-
forcement of property rights), there are a
number of special functions and tasks to be
considered under the circumstances of
transition. The introduction of bankruptcy
must fit into a general sequence of institu-
tion building and economic policy. These
aspects must be considered in the timing
and design of a bankruptcy institution. The
first such condition concerns the responsi-
bility of corporate managers of hitherto
state- owned firms in financial distress be-
cause of decisions taken before the change
of system. For instance, longer-term invest-
ment decisions suffer especially if the origi-
nal rationale disappears after changes that
nobody had predicted, or decisions were not
even taken or executed by corporate man-
agers. The responsibility of management for
corporate failure in the first period of tran-
sition is low, so that the threat function of
bankruptcy is not very strong.1
                                                
1 It is another matter that management’s responsibil-
ity gradually increases to a later peak, by which time
the threat function of bankruptcy has probably taken
7Because the reasons for financial fail-
ure may be exogenous, it may also be useful
to shape the bankruptcy regulation in a way
favourable to the debtor. Bankruptcy pro-
ceedings should further corporate restruc-
turing rather than liquidation. Faulty deci-
sions in the past do not necessarily imply
that a company is not now viable and its
assets should be reallocated. Creditors, on
the other hand, may argue that transition
shocks affected other parties as well, and
their chances of successful adjustment are
not enhanced by pro-debtor bankruptcy
regulation. Creditors may need to collect
receivables to stabilize their own activity, so
that support for debtors may exacerbate the
financial situation of creditors, by produc-
ing sustained payment arrears. A pro-
creditor design for the bankruptcy institu-
tion is also supported by the argument that
adjustment is best enhanced by rigorous
bankruptcy rules. The strengthening of
property rights must be given high priority
in countries where they were neglected for
decades. It may also be easier to introduce
full-scale regulation overnight than go for a
gradual introduction.2
The next specific feature of transition
economies is the large number of firms in
financial distress. Relatively few firms in
mature market economies get into financial
trouble deep enough to warrant the use of
bankruptcy. Signals of trouble are sighted in
good time for corrections or even potential
reallocation of assets to be made. In the
transition economies, distress among firms,
especially important, big state-owned en-
terprises were troubled on a mass scale.
Their simultaneous reorganization or liqui-
dation was not simply problematic from the
technical point of view (little experience
with bankruptcy, shortage of liquidators
and judges, lack of experience of creditors).
                                                                         
effect.
2 Experiences with gradual institutional reform have
shown up inadequacies in the approach in many
cases. The biggest dangers to institutional reform are
to allow many exceptions, to grant temporary ex-
emptions from legal stipulations, or to introduce
government agencies to perform functions that
should be automatic.
It was also difficult to cope politically with
many bankrupted firms, because of the
massive unemployment and loss of assets
entailed, and the possibility of opportunistic
behaviour by existing management (asset
stripping). On the other hand, the discipli-
nary force of new institutions, including
bankruptcy, acted to enable effective ad-
justment and prevent the other type of op-
portunism, which is free riding.3
Another core issue of bankruptcy
regulation, apart from striking an adequate
balance between liquidation and reorgani-
zation, is the triggering of the proceedings.
Ideally, interested parties should be
prompted to initiate proceedings by self-
interest. Creditors and debtors alike may
find this benefits them. Creditors may gain
control over how their claims are used and
influence over management and liquidation
decisions (probably resulting in a partial
settlement of their claims). Debtors may file
for reorganization in the hope that a settle-
ment with creditors may avert failure.4 The
judicial proceedings of reorganization,
however, are usually avoided through out-
of-court agreements, especially in countries
with stringent bankruptcy regulations (such
as Germany), where reorganization entails
substantial administrative difficulties.
One of the biggest problems with the
bankruptcy institution in transition econo-
mies is the reluctance of both creditors and
debtors to institute proceedings. With debt-
ors, this is mainly due to weak, debtor-
                                                
3 Opportunistic behaviour by corporate management
is commonly observed in Eastern European coun-
tries. The courting of favours or subsidies is not con-
fined to state-owned enterprises, as the old, pater-
nalistic relationships and behaviour survive privati-
zation. Ineffective privatization methods and tenta-
tive institutional reform help to undermine the
credibility of economic policy. Although it is less
surprising to find old paternalistic ties surviving in
the CIS countries and the Balkans, Brom and Oren-
stein (1993), Stark (1996) and McDermott (1996)
draw attention to the possibility of similar linkages in
strongly transforming countries such as the Czech
Republic and Hungary.
4 Reorganization in mature market economies shows
a remarkably high proportion of success, in which
creditors avoid further major losses and an efficient
reallocation of assets (change of activities) occurs.
8friendly bankruptcy law that is weakly or
hesitantly enforced. This lack of determina-
tion in starting and supporting microeco-
nomic restructuring through bankruptcy
derives from fears of the economic and po-
litical consequences, sometimes hidden be-
hind other considerations of institutional
development. For example, companies par-
ticipating in the Czech voucher-
privatization scheme were exempted from
the terms of bankruptcy law, as was the
whole agricultural sector. The argument
advanced – that the success of privatization
policy depended largely on the performance
of the participating companies – was a false
one, since the real, long-term performance
of the companies concerned was not de-
pendent on the introduction of the bank-
ruptcy law. Masking the problems post-
poned the solution of them and exacerbated
the situation in many cases. Such weak en-
forcement of the law formed part of the ‘su-
perficial transformation’ of the Czech econ-
omy.5
The reasons for creditor passiveness in
instituting bankruptcy have been discussed
thoroughly by Mitchell (1993). The one
factor to emphasize here is the role of state,
in weak enforcement of the law and be-
haviour that reflects a complex web of
vested interests. For the state plays multiple
roles in this situation. It is responsible as a
reformer for developing the basic institu-
tions of a market economy. Meanwhile, it
has a responsibility as the owner of the
largest debtor firms for restructuring and
for any losses occurring in the process.
Furthermore, the state is among the credi-
tors, because the major banks and many
important suppliers will be state-owned.
Thus the state, through its agents (manag-
                                                
5 Some other transition economies likewise eschewed
drastic bankruptcy practice as a way of enhancing
structural changes. In the Ukraine, for example, a
special presidential committee was charged with
deciding whether bankruptcy law should or should
not be applied in specific cases. Similar practice was
pursued in Romania. Governments repeatedly an-
nounced that a number of big, ailing companies had
to undergo bankruptcy proceedings, only to back-
track when faced with savage populist attacks from
the opposition.
ers), holds all the important positions and
autonomous managerial decision-making
becomes almost impossible. Corporate
autonomy proved unable to develop fully in
the reforming Hungarian economy before
the transition, in a period when the business
environment was less troubled. The state in
all the transition economies remained ac-
tivist in its behaviour long after the initial
months and years of transition. The interests
of the affected parties of financially ailing
companies are therefore complicated. Or-
derly solutions are impeded by opportunis-
tic behaviour by management and by con-
flicting interests among various government
agencies.6 Under such circumstances, debt-
ors and creditors alike might also hope for
state intervention, i.e. a partial or total debt
write-off. This expectation proved realistic
in all transition economies, where govern-
ments decided on major bailout pro-
grammes.
Faced with the passiveness shown by
creditors, Hungarian legislators introduced
into bankruptcy law an automatic trigger,
which worked effectively. Firms defaulting
on payments for more than 90 days, re-
gardless of the amount, were legally bound
to file either for reorganization or for liqui-
dation. The responsibility of filing under
these conditions lay with corporate manag-
ers. Consequently, a massive wave of
bankruptcies started in April 1992, with
several thousand filings a month until the
end of that year. Several parallel laws were
introduced to support the proper function-
ing of bankruptcy. Measurement of the fi-
nancial and business situation of firms and
selection of viable and non-viable activities
                                                
6 With reorganization negotiations, for example,
representatives of the state as owner perform the
roles of both creditor and debtor. Also involved are
agents of several state authorities (tax, social secu-
rity, customs), and occasionally people from minis-
tries responsible for regional development or indus-
try. Hungarian practice showed that a reorganiza-
tion plan could only be arrived at after being sanc-
tioned at the highest level (usually by the Ministry of
Finance), as state creditors would pass the responsi-
bility for deciding up to this level. Commercial
creditors, on the other hand, usually bargained sin-
gly.
9were supported by a new law on account-
ing, which required, for example, proper
classification of receivables and the re-
valuation of assets. New accounting meth-
ods allowed managers to evaluate the con-
ditions of different activities separately. The
new law on banking prompted the banks,
the biggest creditors, to face the problems of
managing bad debt.7 However, the passive-
ness of the banks was not reduced simply by
this. Management of the large amount of
bad debt that was revealed was solved only
by major state intervention. Several months
and years passed before the banks estab-
lished the necessary departments and
gained experience in bad-debt manage-
ment. The ultimate spur to proper debt
management by banks came with the
preparations for effective privatization,
which entailed mastering the problems with
ailing debtor clients.8
HUNGARY’S 1992 INTRODUCTION
OF THE INSTITUTION OF BANKRUPTCY
Authors frequently list the jolts undergone
by the Hungarian economy in the early
years of the transition. They include the oft-
mentioned demand shocks (collapse of
markets, lifting of state protection, liberali-
zation of markets, etc.) and some important
institutional, ‘supply-side’ shocks. Firms had
to adjust their activity to changing demand
and concurrently to changing institutions.
The new accounting practice, for example,
required firms to make a complete overhaul
of their accounting systems, involving the
retraining of staff and computerization.
                                                
7 New, stringent prudential regulations were intro-
duced and banks were required to set aside adequate
reserves for risk coverage.
8 Despite the strong efforts of the banks and the gov-
ernment, there were still cases where a foreign buyer
had been unable to survey properly the position of a
purchased bank, which led to long debates and dis-
putes. Ultimately, the state had to take over further
parts of the bad debts of banks that had already been
privatized.
Major managerial effort and outlay also
went into adjusting to the new tax, social-
security and customs systems and many
other conditions. The introduction of new
practices with new or reformed institutions
set obligatory ‘homework’ for managers and
firms that were more or less strictly con-
trolled, and in doing so, used up time,
money and managerial effort that could
equally have been used to develop responses
to demand shocks. Some of the institutional
shocks were as painful as the demand
shocks, notably Hungary’s harsh bank-
ruptcy law, which called for major mana-
gerial effort from debtors and creditors,
while closely affecting much corporate ac-
tivity. For instance, the creditworthiness of
firms changed almost overnight.
The double set of shocks prevented
most companies from adjusting rapidly in
1990–91, before the introduction of the
bankruptcy law. They simply lacked the
necessary human and financial resources to
do so. Many state-owned firms had high
expectations of state intervention, which led
them to pursue a wait-and-see policy (Laki,
1994). They even felt that passiveness was
ethically correct, since managers could
hardly be blamed for the current bad situa-
tion. The credibility of economic policy had
not yet been established at this time, so that
the expectations of a state bailout seemed
realistic. Firms continued to produce for
stock and their debts continued to build up.
The high inventory levels and the aftermath
of the high borrowing in the 1980s for
major investment projects placed a high
debt burden on many companies. Corporate
finances suffered badly from soaring inter-
est rates, which effectively multiplied debt-
servicing obligations that could not be fi-
nanced from declining sales revenues. New
credits were still being extended and old
ones rolled over.
Kornai (1993) identified as the un-
derlying problem in establishing and oper-
ating a market economy the survival of soft
budget constraints, which allowed firms to
postpone their adjustment to the two sets of
shocks. The most obvious signs of softness
were measured on four levels of loose pay-
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ment discipline. Firms paid for their sup-
plies after long delays or not at all, so that a
large volume of inter-company debt arrears
emerged. Debtors failed to meet their obli-
gations (violated their debt contracts). Debt
arrears also accumulated with organs of the
state (tax, social security and customs). Fi-
nally, Kornai stated that most companies
were unable to finance operating costs from
sales revenues, so that they made trading
losses, not profits.
Periods of recession may occur when
most companies sink below profitability.
Although there is a time lag between supply
and payment, whose length varies in differ-
ent nations and trades, the question here is
whether the level of arrears was normal and
potentially improving in Hungary – if the
general loss-making by companies was
temporary or chronic in character. Could
economic policy-makers hope for a general
improvement without major intervention, of
a restrictive type or in the form of massive
bailouts? The decision to introduce the
bankruptcy law shows that the Hungarian
government did not believe spontaneous
correction would occur. The liquidity posi-
tion of firms continued to decline through-
out 1990 and 1991, with high debt arrears
accumulating in all three directions, espe-
cially among firms. The liquidity crisis
threatened to bring a breakdown of the fi-
nancial system, as firms began to avoid us-
ing banks in inter-company settlements,
and cash payments and barter gained im-
portance.9
                                                
9 If the similar experiences of most CIS countries are
ignored for a moment and the issue considered from
a market-economic angle, it becomes easy to appre-
ciate the extraordinary dangers. Consider what
would have happened to Austria, for example, if it
had lost its German markets and cooperating part-
ners, for Hungary suffered an equivalent upset when
it lost its former COMECON markets and partners. A
very similar situation would have emerged in Aus-
tria, undermining the value of its currency and the
position of its banks. Customers would have let down
the Creditanstalt and Hypobank, stopped money
transfers, and perhaps even abandoned the local
currency in favour of German marks or US dollars,
on a strictly cash basis. One can hardly describe any
such situation as normal, and as the CIS countries or
the example of Yugoslavia show, it is not an impossi-
ble event. Begg and Portes (1993) also include po-
Curing the liquidity problems in the
Hungarian economy by strengthening fi-
nancial discipline was the main purpose of
introducing a bankruptcy law with an
automatic trigger, along with the laws on
accountancy and financial institutions
mentioned earlier. This, along with general
considerations of institution building, was
the single most important policy goal of the
moment. Kornai (1993) gives figures for
inter-company debt arrears in the 1980s
and early 1990s, using the list of companies
banned from the Hungarian National Bank’s
rediscount list. In other words, the data
cover firms and corporate debt not only
formally overdue, but rated by the central
bank as non-performing. The stated amount
of this in April 1992 was almost HUF 200
billion. Szanyi (1999) put at another HUF
150 billion the amount of bad debt accu-
mulated by banks, while a further HUF 150
billion was owed to state organizations. The
early 1992 level of debt arrears, to the tune
of almost HUF 500 billion, was equivalent
to 21–2 per cent of 1991 GDP.10 After the
introduction of the bankruptcy law, the
number of companies on the National Bank
list and the totals owed decreased substan-
tially, to HUF 74 billion by the end of the
year. Since then, the amount has varied
between HUF 40 and 80 billion, which is a
remarkable decline, especially if inflation is
considered.
Arrears of debt owed to the social-
security system appear in Table 1. These ac-
cumulated rapidly until 1992, when the
process slowed and then levelled off in
1995. Thereafter, further slight increases
were caused mainly by increments of inter-
est and fines charged, without sizeable
amounts of new debt being incurred. The
trend was influenced by stronger debt col-
lection and by stronger corporate payment
discipline and strengthening of the budget
                                                                         
tential breakdown of the financial system in their list
of the dangers from loose payment discipline.
10 Debt arrears may have been higher in some other
transition economies fighting more notorious liquid-
ity problems. In their case, perhaps as frightening as
the level of debt itself was the ample evidence of fail-
ure of the financial system.
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constraints. This is even clearer if it is re-
membered that much of the debt was ac-
cumulated by a handful of state-owned
firms and institutions. The biggest debtor is
Hungarian State Railways (MÁV Rt.) which
owes over HUF 7 billion, but even the tax
authority itself owed several hundred mil-
lion in certain periods!
Table 1
Outstanding claims by
the social-security system
(HUF billion)
Year
Principal
claims
(1)
Fines and
interest
(2)
Collected
debt
(3)
Principal
debt
(1–2+3)
1990 23.9 23.9
1991 54.4 7.2 47.2
1992 90.6 15.5 75.1
1993 141.7 26.6 115.1
1994 189.1 45.6 15.0 158.5
1995 222.9 58.6 30.6 194.9
1996 221.5 66.8 36.7 191.4
1997 230.0 80.7 36.5 185.8
Source: Népszabadság, March 7. 1998 and own cal-
culations
The declining trend in settlement ar-
rears is clear, but it is not clear whether the
decline was triggered by the new bank-
ruptcy law. Some observers (Bonin and
Schaffer, 1995; Schaffer, 1997) argue that
the liquidity problems of the Hungarian
economy did not require such harsh meas-
ures and the improving trends could have
been produced at less cost by relying on
other, indirect tools, such as financial-sector
development. According to Bonin and
Schaffer (1995), payment discipline was not
bad enough in 1991 to warrant the intro-
duction of such harsh bankruptcy regula-
tions. They argued that much of the accu-
mulated debt was inherited from the previ-
ous economic system and the liquidity
problem had a stock character rather than a
flow character. After analysing bank port-
folios, they stated that extended new debt
was a less important reason. According to
Kornai’s data on inter-company debt ar-
rears and our data on public debt, it is clear
that corporate debt accumulation acceler-
ated in 1990–91, at least in these two di-
rections. According to other sources (The
Banker, July 1992), less than 40 per cent of
the stock of corporate debt held by banks in
1992 originated from the period up to
1990. The majority was due to new bor-
rowing, although some of it may have been
good money being thrown after bad,
through the rolling over of old debt. How-
ever, the possibility of rolling over non-
performing debt is in itself a clear sign of a
soft budget constraint.
Evidence of declining debt arrears af-
ter the new bankruptcy law was introduced
is described in Bonin and Schaffer (1995) as
a ‘statistical illusion’ resulting from the
temporary ban on foreclosures and debt
collection. After filing for reorganization,
banks did not report banned bad debt. This
is also a weak argument. Such claims would
become due again after the period of grace
expired (even if restructured by the reor-
ganization agreement) and no such subse-
quent major increase in debt arrears can be
observed. Thus, the stock of bad debt must
have been curbed in the longer run by the
new law.11
Schaffer (1997) refined the argument
and analysed other areas of payment disci-
pline besides bank debt. Of the four areas in
which Kornai (1992) identified soft budget
constraints, there were no major problems
in three before the introduction of the law.
Temporary loss making in periods of reces-
sion is normal in mature market economies
as well. Schaffer also analysed macroeco-
nomic statistics of the general stock of debt
in the economy (end-period receivables as a
percentage of GDP, instead of the National
Bank data for qualified bad debt), finding
that it was not very high or increasing very
rapidly. What really happened, in his view,
was a sudden increase of debt to public
budgetary funds, while the general level of
debt and average term of payment were not
very great by international standards.
                                                
11 It is another matter to say how much banks were
able to collect and how much they had to write off.
The fact is that there was an improvement – a drop
in the stock of debt – so that the old debt eliminated
significantly exceeded the amount of new non-
performing debt building up. This also means that
the practice of rolling over old debt had been limited
at least.
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Our interpretation of these facts is
different. An increase in debt to public
budgetary funds up to 1995 may be evi-
dence of the limitations of the new law in
imposing hard budget constraints on eco-
nomic agents. What probably happened
was a shift of debt accumulation from
commerce (banks and suppliers) towards
the public sector between 1992 and 1995.12
But this does not falsify our assertion that
corporate payment discipline in the inter-
company and bank relations was weak on
the eve of the introduction of the law. Nor
does it contradict our other statement that
improving payment discipline in commer-
cial ties was largely due to the new law. It
proves only that the debt problem was hard
to master and companies took the opportu-
nity to move some of their debt onto the
least efficient debt collector, which was the
state.13 The argument that the indebtedness
was not high by international standards and
the payment periods not exceptionally long
is based on false comparisons. What really
matter are changes, not absolute levels.
Countries on Schaffer’s lists that work with
shorter payment periods (say Scandinavian
countries, at 1.6 months) would probably
not regard as normal abrupt changes in the
conditions, even within the scope of other
countries’ levels (say Italy’s 3.0 months or
France’s 3.5).
Rostowski and Nikolic (1998) col-
lected figures on real bank credit to enter-
prises, finding that the level of new credits
extended to enterprises stagnated in Hun-
gary between 1989 and 1993 compared
with other transition economies, while it fell
substantially in the Czech Republic, Slova-
kia and Poland. This lending behaviour by
banks is especially remarkable because GDP
declined by over 20 per cent in the same
period. In our view, this is further evidence
                                                
12 This shift was also confirmed by Mitchell (1997).
13 Mitchell (1997) provided data about the changing
behaviour of state agents towards debtors in 1995.
Economic policy changed: because the high level of
public debt led to more emphasis on debt collection,
including the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings,
so that the state became a more rigorous creditor.
of soft budget constraints in the financial
sector.
Hardening the still soft budget con-
straint was one important factor behind the
new law. Another was enhancement of cor-
porate adjustment. The transition period
called for structural changes and restruc-
turing of assets on a large scale. This was
the primary, long-term way of making cor-
porate adjustment. Several surveys collected
empirical and anecdotal evidence of cor-
porate adjustment in the early transition
years. Laki (1993) and Török (1993)
stressed the passive, wait-and-see attitude of
large state-owned enterprises, which hardly
acted to change their bad and worsening
situation. More optimistic observers identi-
fied minor, if rather defensive changes
(Szanyi, 1992) described by Grosfeld and
Roland (1995) as ‘defensive restructuring’.
Defensive restructuring was aimed
mainly at selling assets to cover financing
activities (or losses). Asset transfers usually
started with welfare facilities (sporting lots,
holiday centres and the like), continued
with expensive headquarters, and finished
with the sale of production plants, indus-
trial estates and machinery (at scrap prices
in many cases), until the assets were ex-
hausted. Defensive restructuring was not
usually controlled by the owners, so that the
risk of opportunistic behaviour was high.
Asset sales amounted in many cases to
asset stripping, with managers selling valu-
able assets at low prices to their own agents.
Asset stripping and depletion of assets con-
tinued in many cases until bankruptcy was
declared, or until the privatization agency
put a stop to the process. In the present
context, the mere fact that defensive re-
structuring resulted in mass transfers of
assets to new owners is particularly inter-
esting.
Yet other observers have also found
cases where defensive restructuring ad-
vanced from the mere sale of assets to initial
steps of adjustment (Belka, 1993; Szanyi,
1996). Many companies went on from re-
ducing their unprofitable assets and activi-
ties to internal restructuring. The first ac-
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tions usually included establishing up-to-
date information and communication sys-
tems at plant level and introducing new
management practices involving high qual-
ity and rapid information transfers. This
approach rapidly improved management
efficiency and flexibility, leading to im-
proved performance.
Research has also been done into the
reasons for ‘improving restructuring’
(Szanyi, 1996). Companies recognized that
the changes in their environment were not
temporary and the twin shocks had her-
alded a new business epoch, while the state
was unable and willing to launch mass res-
cue programmes to absorb the shocks.14
What tended to convince economic agents
that they were on their own was the in-
creasing credibility of economic policy. The
other important boost to such credibility
came from effective privatization. Bank-
ruptcy and privatization together persuaded
managers to try to shape events according
their own expectations and interests, ac-
cording to the rules of the game. If they did
nothing to forestall market exit, no one was
going to give them a hand. But if they ad-
justed and saved their company, they would
have a say in the process of privatization as
well. The stick and carrot were provided,
and many companies susceptible to reor-
ganization were converted into viable busi-
                                                
14 Shock absorption in the transition economies took
a variety of forms. The crucial difference in Hungary
was that the limits of state intervention were set early
and more or less observed. Direct or indirect sub-
ventions to state firms were quickly reduced and not
continued in elusive indirect forms, as in many other
countries. McDermott (1996) and others demon-
strated that the cross-ownership created through
Czech privatization was an effective tool for covert
subsidization of formally privatized companies. This
support then postponed real corporate adjustment.
Another frequent method of covert subsidization was
exchange-rate policy. The stabilization programme
introduced would include massive currency de-
valuation that artificially enhanced the cost com-
petitiveness of firms, even if they had done nothing
to improve their activities. This was especially true if
there was a big overshooting in the devaluation.
Rostowski and Nikolic (1998) provided evidence of
massive subsidization through exchange rate policy
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This period was
much shorter in Poland and virtually absent in Hun-
gary, where there was no major real devaluation.
nesses, despite the hardships of bank-
ruptcy.15
This, in the author’s view, gave the
decisive impetus for massive, effective cor-
porate restructuring, even if it did not result
in immediate ‘strategic restructuring’,
mainly for lack of capital and because of
high exit barriers. One major survey of cor-
porate investments indicated that firms not
in foreign ownership were usually unable to
conduct massive investment projects re-
sulting in complete updating or change of
their activities, for lack of the financial tools
(Szanyi and Szemlér, 1997). But after the
establishment of a credible economic policy,
restructuring began and slowly gained
scope and pace, producing in the medium
term ventures that were successful and
competitive. Credibility of economic policy
was established through the interplay of
bankruptcy and privatization.
PRIVATIZATION AND BANKRUPTCY AS
THE PILLARS OF A CREDIBLE
ECONOMIC POLICY IN HUNGARY
This chapter continues the analysis of the
relationships between privatization and
bankruptcy practice in Hungary. Reference
has already been made to the importance of
the timing and sequencing of new bank-
ruptcy laws in transition economies. In
terms of general economic policy, the mes-
sage given by the circumstances of intro-
duction may determine the way that eco-
nomic agents interpret new institutions and
government intentions and the credit they
give to economic policy. For bankruptcy is
among the basic institutions for enforcing
property rights and contract law, and the
main means by which the negative conse-
                                                
15 Maybe the long experience of Hungarian eco-
nomic policy-makers with various methods of giving
managers incentives to behave according to expec-
tations provided what in our view is an effective way
to stimulate corporate adjustment.
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quences of risk taking and failure can ap-
ply. The absence of credible bankruptcy
practice will encourage opportunistic be-
haviour by agents, in commercial relations
and in their approach to other institutional
reforms, including privatization.
The first and most important link be-
tween bankruptcy and privatization has al-
ready been described. Realization of the
limits of state intervention and the simulta-
neous opportunity for managers to become
owners (or at least to influence the privati-
zation of the firms they manage) encour-
aged them to curb their opportunistic prac-
tices and concentrate on strategic adjust-
ment. The limits on adjustment were in
most cases due anyway to inadequate finan-
cial resources rather than opportunistic be-
haviour or incompetence.
Hungarian privatization gained mo-
mentum at exactly the same time as the new
bankruptcy law was introduced. In the first
two years of transition (1990–1), the priva-
tization agency was engaged in its own es-
tablishment and development and with the
problem of stopping spontaneous privatiza-
tion. In fact, privatization policy was aimed
at maintaining and securing state property
rather than at reducing it. Privatizers, as
representatives of the state owners, had
strong remits to engage in corporate deci-
sion-making. They were allowed to override
management decisions and even decide at
day-to-day, operational levels, if they saw
state property being threatened by manage-
rial opportunism or incompetence. This
early period of privatization policy curbed
the autonomy of managers without putting
forward an alternative solution. The privati-
zation agency had no time and staff to make
operative decisions itself, but it did not al-
low autonomous decision-making either.
This failure led to crises in many companies,
exactly at a time when external shocks were
calling for deliberate action.
Managers were discouraged from
making strategic decisions even if the pri-
vatization agency had not taken direct con-
trol of the company. The strong emphasis
on stopping spontaneous privatization and
asset stripping was seen as a threat to man-
agers, who therefore postponed many ur-
gent decisions on asset restructuring, for
fear of accusations of asset stripping. The
paradox is strong. The external shocks
called for massive adjustment responses,
including the reallocation of assets, which
were precluded by the distrustful privatiza-
tion policy. Uncertainty was increased be-
cause discussions about privatization meth-
ods and policies were still taking place at
this stage. Managers did not know what be-
haviour was expected by the privatizers or
potential owners, and their willingness to
make strategic decisions was undermined
further by the ownership uncertainties. One
consequence, in many cases, was a dramatic
deterioration in the corporate financial
situation, with the serious liquidity prob-
lems already described.
This strange situation began to change
in 1992, with the introduction of the three
basic laws and a change in privatization
policy. By this time, spontaneous privatiza-
tion had effectively ceased, while the struc-
ture of the privatization agency had con-
solidated and sufficient staff been recruited,
and most importantly, the directions for an
active privatization policy had been set. The
ownership uncertainties had been consid-
erably reduced. Managers knew at least
what they could expect (including the roles
they might potentially play), even if they did
not know who would be the new owners.
Distrust of managers also decreased with
the passage of time and personal acquain-
tance between them and the privatizers. The
emerging privatization policy and the inef-
ficiency of the privatization agency, how-
ever, seriously contributed to the massive
liquidity crisis in the corporate sector.16
                                                
16 It should not be forgotten that the overwhelming
majority of essential economic activity was still car-
ried out by the state-owned sector. Although the ex-
ternal shocks were exacerbated by ownership un-
certainty, resulting in corporate failures, there is
considerable evidence of weak performance in the
existing private sector as well. Many of the flagship
companies of ‘goulash communism’ also failed in
this period. It seems that the external shocks affected
private and state-owned firms alike.
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From the angle of this survey, it is im-
portant to emphasize that asset transfers
were promoted by the bankruptcy law
through several channels. There was a clear
direct impact from the physical exit of firms
from markets, resulting in liquidation and
asset sales, but adjusting firms were also
forced through bankruptcy and privatiza-
tion, so that assets could be reallocated
wherever possible to uses that offered a
better return. This produced a massive flow
of assets, despite the fact that local capital
markets were still rudimentary. Asset
transfers were typical for all the adjusting
firms – for those who did this successfully
and escaped formal market exit, and for
those who did not.
The next question to consider was
whether privatization or the character of
privatization policy could save firms from
bankruptcy and market exit. Balance-sheet
analysis of Hungarian firms, private and
state-owned, produced no evidence that ei-
ther group performed better in the period
up to 1995. Voszka (1997) and Csányi
(1997) both found a statistically insignifi-
cant difference between state-owned and
private firms in the Hungarian economy.17
This we interpret as evidence that privati-
zation alone could not effectively alter the
fate of firms, at least in the short run. Priva-
tization was no panacea, and factors other
than ownership determined the chances of
stabilization at corporate level, the major
ones being sector, spatial location and man-
ager capabilities.
Ways and means of privatization
might influence adjustment capabilities and
performance, however. This problem was at
the centre of the criticism of voucher priva-
tization, which in the case of the Czech Re-
public, produced unclear governance pat-
terns that effectively blocked corporate ad-
justment and long-term improvement of
                                                
17 Each used a variety of performance measures. The
results corroborate well with the empirical evidence
of similar adjustment intensity by firms, described by
Szanyi (1996) and by Belka (1993) for Poland.
performance.18 The emergence of liquidity
problems in the corporate sector of virtually
all transition economies suggests that it was
impossible to escape the tasks of adjustment
and structural changes by any privatization
method or state cushioning of economic
shocks.
Frydman and Rapaczinsky (1994) also
list among the tasks of privatization the re-
placement of incumbent management. This
issue has more of a political nature. As
mentioned earlier, the frequent replacement
of incumbent management is not fully jus-
tified and may do harm rather than good
from the business point of view. It is mis-
taken to think that the management of a
previous regime can be deprived of its busi-
ness power, which is the political aim of
such replacement exercises. It is not very
likely that top managers will be available in
large numbers to replace the experts of the
old era. Furthermore, organic, gradual re-
placement is more likely to succeed than a
blitz. On the other hand, incumbent man-
agement possesses insider knowledge of
companies and markets that cannot be
transferred or acquired from outside. If the
existing management is removed, this
knowledge is lost and used against the com-
pany itself if fired managers open their own
business, which will usually be a strong
competitor. Hungarian privatization policy
was to rely on the self-interest of incumbent
management rather than fight against them.
To politically neutral observers, re-
placement and disqualification of incum-
bent management seems less important than
breaking with the old, paternalistic link-
ages. The accumulation of debt arrears was
also due to surviving paternalism and op-
portunistic behaviour of managers. The
shift of business contacts towards regular
commercial links was largely enhanced.
Privatization contributed to the process with
the establishment of governance structures
common in market economies (the sales
method instead of give-away-type solu-
                                                
18 An excellent analysis of governance problems ap-
pears in Frydman, Gray and Rapaczynski (1996).
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tions). New owners certainly did not resist
taking over old linkages whenever they
could make use of them. Thus, we do not
declare that paternalism was eliminated. In
fact, such linkages can be observed in all
countries. It is important here that the in-
tensity and frequency should be limited.
This was enhanced by strict enforcement of
property rights and contract law through
the practice of bankruptcy.
WAYS OF ASSET TRANSFER THROUGH
MARKET EXIT: DOWNSIZING AND
LIQUIDATION
The introduction of the new bankruptcy law
caused massive macroeconomic changes.
Although the law itself was not responsible
for the shocks or the reasons behind cor-
porate failures, it triggered them simultane-
ously in many companies. The negative mi-
croeconomic developments, coinciding in
time, compounded to cause serious macro-
economic problems. The year 1992 marked
the trough in the recession, when the Min-
istry of Finance estimated that proceedings
started in that year alone affected compa-
nies producing 25 per cent of GDP and 35
per cent of exports, and employing over
800,000 people (Zsubori, 1992). There
were other estimates with different figures
(Holló, 1994), but the conclusions were
similar: the effects of bankruptcy were ex-
tremely wide-ranging.
At first sight, the figures seem fright-
eningly high. What would happen to an
economy of which one-third was threat-
ened by liquidation and in a financial state
to justify such a procedure? Would one-
third of GDP be eliminated almost over-
night? Would 800,000 people – 30 per cent
of the industrial workforce – lose their jobs
overnight? Fears of severe consequences
were understandable, but the bankruptcy
institution proved to be efficient in reducing
losses to a considerably lower level. Three
factors can be mentioned. First, the regula-
tions showed preference for reorganization
during the first 21 months, up to September
1993, when an amendment practically
closed the paths to de jure restructuring.
This meant that the law, in the initial, most
serious period, provided opportunities for
sides to reach a settlement. Secondly, when
formal reorganization was contained, the
law still allowed liquidations to transform
into reorganizations in cases where the
debtor was retained as a going concern and
its activity was regarded as viable. The re-
structuring of debtors was promoted mainly
by the way liquidators were remunerated.
This side of the law seriously weakened the
position of creditors in liquidation pro-
ceedings, since they were no longer
awarded increased control over the activity
of the liquidator. But the outcome of the
changes was that liquidators took over the
role of formal reorganization. The latter
disappeared, but wherever some production
or meaningful activity by the debtor re-
mained, the liquidators would exert them-
selves to maintain and consolidate that ac-
tivity.19
The third factor that ameliorated the
consequences of bankruptcy was action by
the state. Ministries and still more the State
Privatization Agency played an active role
in avoiding crises and made efforts to bail
out certain firms (including the so-called
‘dirty dozen’). The state as owner injected
some capital. Most importantly, it mediated
among the parties – who in some cases were
almost exclusively representatives of the
state. It was argued earlier in the paper that
state intervention in bankruptcy proceed-
ings was undesirable, especially in the early
phase when proceedings are triggered.
Hungarian practice generally allowed the
proceedings to start, but there was inter-
vention in several cases when important
firms could not be rescued through either of
the other ‘built-in’ factors. The number of
firms that benefited from direct state inter-
vention was confined to one or two dozen,
so that these few exceptions did not under-
                                                
19 A detailed description of the legal changes appears
in Gray et al. (1996).
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mine the new-found credibility of economic
policy.
Reorganization agreements were also
promoted outside judicial proceedings.
Banks were urged to settle their disputes
with debtors and manage their non-
performing portfolios. The law on financial
institutions required banks to establish
portfolio-management departments and
prescribed strict prudential regulations. In
addition, the state put up very considerable
sums of money, to help banks to build up
the necessary risk reserves and to compen-
sate them to some extent for writing off
certain parts of their debt portfolios. Bank
recapitalization was in fact the strongest
direct action undertaken by the Hungarian
government to eliminate the liquidity prob-
lems in the economy.20 The bank consolida-
tions were not very damaging to credibility.
The customers (debtors) of banks were not
affected directly. Banks usually did not
write off the obligations of active firms,
which were rescheduled or converted into
equity instead. On the other hand, the
elimination of non-performing assets was
enhanced. As far as banks themselves were
concerned, cleaning up their portfolios was
a precondition for privatization to foreign
buyers. The prospect of privatization pro-
vided the safeguard against bank oppor-
tunism.
The outcome of bankruptcy proceed-
ings also has to be gauged in terms of asset
restructuring. A surge of market exits, espe-
cially in the form of liquidations, would
presuppose large-scale asset restructuring,
if the assets could be used economically. A
major concern of pessimistic observers
could be that the inheritance from the dec-
ades of the command economy: assets, cre-
ated under a different socio-economic ra-
tionale, might be inappropriate under a
market economy, causing huge asset wast-
age. In the event, losses occurred, but
mainly before the stage of formal market
                                                
20 A more detailed description of a bank conciliation
process appears in Gray and Holle (1997) with ref-
erence to Poland. This resembles the Hungarian pro-
cess in many respects.
exit. The assets lost their value at the mo-
ment of economic transition and were
scrapped in most cases, leaving behind, if
anything, debt or environmental damage
(another form of debt). Such debt and losses
were inescapable. Failed companies left
empty workshops and rusty equipment in
all the transition economies, demonstrating
how this inescapable type of asset loss oc-
curred irrespective of the judicial regime
for market exit, even in countries with no
active bankruptcy practice.
Asset losses cannot be regarded as
transfers, but they are an important con-
stituent of restructuring – the necessary
Schumpeterian process of creative destruc-
tion. They are not necessarily connected
directly with bankruptcy, on which real
asset transfers may depend either directly or
indirectly. The direct link is most obvious in
a sale of assets under a reorganization
agreement or liquidation proceedings. Asset
transfers, on the other hand, occurred also
in day-by-day business, in some cases
linked indirectly to bankruptcy, as firms
sold assets to avoid bankruptcy – to gain
cash and repay debt or change corporate
activity and avoid a prospective long-term
crisis. Without the threat function of
bankruptcy, this type of asset restructuring
might not have occurred or been less vigor-
ous. The mere existence of the bankruptcy
institution can therefore trigger major re-
structuring activity, including asset trans-
fers.
It is hard to measure real asset re-
structuring of either type. Aggregate data
for formal judicial reorganizations do not
contain information on asset restructuring
and the other, ‘normal’ type of restructuring
is even less visible. The few estimates of its
scale have been made by analysing panel
data and empirical surveys. Some underly-
ing characteristics of the process and a few
methodological problems emerge from
three such surveys.
The results of the first, covering 100
state enterprises undergoing formal re-
structuring (not liquidation), were pub-
lished by Futó (1993). These were big in-
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dustrial firms that had not been randomly
selected and employed 55,000 people in
1992. The first important conclusion was
that their problems had arisen well before
the new bankruptcy legislation. Their size
(measured in total sales and employment)
fell by far more than the total economy
shrank between 1990 and 1992 and their
labour productivity declined by 10 per cent
over the same period. The size changes were
caused by several factors, one important one
being asset sales and another changes in
organization, aimed mainly in this period at
hiving off viable activities.21 In many cases,
there was a deliberate selection of activities,
carried out without strong effects from the
bankruptcy institution. This resulted in asset
transfers in the form of sale or asset strip-
ping. Bankruptcy affected mainly the re-
maining activities that were performing
worse.22 Futó (1993) also measured the ef-
fects of the market shocks that contributed
to falling sales and decreasing size. Inter-
estingly, the group of enterprises suffering
the largest loss of markets (sales fell to 13
per cent in two years) did not reduce their
size proportionally. Employment remained
at 29 per cent. State-owned firms with big
losses tended to respond with less radical
downsizing than those that suffered less.
Labour productivity (measured as a simple
division of employment into sales) therefore
fell more in the group of companies sur-
veyed. Another interesting finding was that
smaller firms were more involved in pay-
ment arrears than big ones. They accumu-
lated much higher stocks of receivables and
obligations, compared with their assets or
turnover, but the two figures were in ap-
                                                
21 Creaming of firms in this period often resulted in
spontaneous privatization, or in worse cases, asset
stripping.
22 Éva Voszka did some fundamental research on
spontaneous privatization and the break-up of the
organizational structure of the most important 45
Hungarian firms (conglomerates). She concluded
that separation of viable and unpromising activities
was correct in most cases, and the outcome of the
process was the survival and privatization of much
of the original activity, and exit (liquidation) from
unviable ones. This early separation effectively saved
profitable activities from collapsing together with
non viable ones (See: Voszka, 1997).
proximate equilibrium. Big firms, on the
other hand, amassed relatively less debt, but
the level of receivables was significantly
lower. It therefore seems that big firms were
more responsible for the acceleration of
payment arrears than smaller ones. Fur-
thermore, the problem in the second case
could not be resolved by a clearing ar-
rangement, mainly because of the big firms.
The claims of smaller firms, at the end of
the chain, were primarily against the big
firms, so that they could not be collected
effectively. Futó (1993) went on to analyse
the liquidity position of the firms in the sur-
vey. This identified three groups of firms.
The first group was affected mainly by mar-
ket losses, while another suffered more from
accumulated debt. Relatively better liquidity
figures were produced by companies able to
reduce their stock of debt through asset
sales that strongly reduced their size. Less
liquid firms also showed marked declines in
production and exports, but to a lesser ex-
tent. Between the extremes, there were
companies with average liquidity and in-
debtedness levels. Their sales remained on
the highest level (especially exports), and
according to Futó, stood better chances of
survival.
Novák and Szanyi (1995) constructed
a panel of 150 large industrial firms, from
data extracted from the lists of the biggest
industrial firms published by the Hungarian
business newspaper Figyel  for the years
1989–93. The panel included firms that did
not undergo liquidation in the period ob-
served and were not subject to major or-
ganizational changes either, which meant it
could be used to measure the real
downsizing of these firms before and after
1992. There was a steady decline in both
output (sales) and employment. The former
was especially dramatic – almost 40 per
cent in 1991, the year before the introduc-
tion of the new bankruptcy law – whereas
there was only 5 per cent decline in sales
thereafter (1992–3). The reduction of em-
ployment was much steadier and not on the
same scale. Over the whole period, sales fell
back to 40 per cent of the 1989 level and
employment to 50 per cent. The authors
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consider that employment was reduced suf-
ficiently compared to sales development: a
minimum level of basic staff needed to re-
main in the hope that sales would recover.
It was also possible to distinguish different
ownership and size groups in the sample. It
was concluded that downsizing was simi-
larly deep in all ownership groups, but pri-
vatized foreign firms recovered more
quickly and tended to scale back employ-
ment more radically than state-owned firms
did. They did so rapidly, while state-owned
firms made reductions more slowly, al-
though the eventual reductions in size were
similar. Hungarian-owned privatized firms
behaved more like state-owned firms,
mainly because they had been following
similar policies before privatization. The
most important conclusion was that firms
not undergoing liquidation or major or-
ganizational changes went in for very
strong downsizing and reorganization,
similar in scale to what happened in the
economy as a whole. Very significant asset
restructuring occurred in firms without
formal bankruptcy, even before the new
bankruptcy law began to bite.
The third survey, described by Gray et
al. (1996), was aimed at the process of for-
mal bankruptcy proceedings, based on a
sample of 117 observations. Details of reor-
ganization agreements were also analysed,
where potential asset transfers were de-
tected. Since the survey was conducted in
1994–5, very few completed liquidations
occurred in the sample, so that little infor-
mation was provided about asset transfers
of this type. The first finding of interest here
was that the proceedings tended to orient
firms showing better financial measures
towards reorganization and weaker firms
towards liquidation. The chance of reor-
ganization went to firms with better
chances of survival. In this respect, the law
was efficient. Another important observa-
tion was that the process of liquidation was
very slow. The first assets were not sold un-
til an average of 13 months after the pro-
ceedings started. Asset transfers were being
blocked by several factors. One group of
obstacles had judicial nature: asset sales
could not be started until legal disputes had
been settled. The other had a regulatory
character. Although remuneration of liqui-
dators depended on the incomes realized in
asset sales, general practice showed a pref-
erence for selling firms as a going concern,
to gain potentially higher revenues, even if
this occurred only much later. This might
be disadvantageous to creditors, but their
influence and control over the liquidators
was limited. A 1995 amendment of the law
increased such influence, but gave liquida-
tors a financial stake in sustaining firms as a
going concern. Consequently, a relatively
small proportion of assets was sold. On the
other hand, the law left some loopholes in
the proceedings. Deliberate tactics by debt-
ors could effectively hold back the pro-
ceedings, most importantly the appointment
of the liquidator. On average, liquidators
were appointed only 10 months after the
filing was made. This long period provided
an opportunity for interested parties, debt-
ors and creditors alike, to reach an out-of-
court settlement, which was fine. But the
opportunity could also be misused and par-
ties indulge in asset stripping or violation of
the absolute priority rule.23 Such tactics fre-
quently resulted in covert transfers of assets.
The survey also analysed the reorganization
agreements. Most involved financial re-
structuring, write-offs of debt principal,
extension of the maturity of debt, and re-
ductions in interest. Only a few involved
financial restructuring of formal asset
transfers: debt to equity swaps or extension
of new credit. Operational reorganizations
were even less significant. Reductions in
employment continued in 60 per cent of the
agreements, but asset sales were planned
only a surprisingly low 30 per cent of
                                                
23 Absolute priority rules are prevalent in bank-
ruptcy legislation, for regulating the meeting of
claims according to a system of priorities between
claimants. Groups of similarly treated claimants are
distinguished (e.g. secured creditors with a lien on
physical assets, government tax and social-security
claims, unpaid wages to employees, claims of unse-
cured creditors, bondholders, claims of trade credi-
tors, and claims of shareholders and other owners).
Each category is settled according to the established
order of priority before the claims of the next class.
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cases.24 Purchases of new assets, equipment,
etc. hardly featured in the reorganization
plans. Questions on what really happened
after the plan was accepted yielded similar
results. Operational reorganization usually
meant a reduction in employment (71 per
cent of cases), and sales of assets (40 per
cent).
An important conclusion can be
drawn here. Empirical evidence suggests
that formal bankruptcy proceedings did not
result in massive waves of market exit. Gray
et al. (1996) concluded that the majority of
the sample firms that underwent reorgani-
zation or liquidation were still active two
years after filing. This was especially true
for larger companies. In cases where liqui-
dation was started against companies that
had ceased to function as a going concern,
market exit happened before the filing.
Market exit was not triggered by the law in
these cases. This emphasizes the importance
of non-bankruptcy cases in large-scale
transfers of assets.
* * * * *
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